This paper studies announcement returns in a sample of 3,667 mergers over the last 55 years in order to shed light on the causes of the waning of corporate diversification. The abnormal combined (acquirer + target) return from diversifying mergers declined over time, consistent with the idea that diversification fell from favor in the 1980s. The market rewarded mergers involving financially constrained firms before but not after 1980, consistent with a declining value of internal capital markets.
1
The Waning of Corporate Diversification
I. Introduction
The rise and decline of corporate diversification is a central episode in the history of the modern corporation. Textron launched the movement in the 1950s when it began acquiring businesses unrelated to its longstanding textile operations; the movement gained steam throughout the 1960s, cresting in the conglomerate merger wave at the end of the decade; stalled in the 1970s, and then entered a period of refocusing through sell offs in the 1980s (Sobel, 1984) . The diversification movement is important to understand not only because it represents a major organizational innovation that continues to be the norm among large corporations (Montgomery, 1994) , but especially because diversification is widely considered to be inefficient, the result of managerial agency problems rather than value maximization (Jensen, 1986 , Stein 2003 ). Yet there is little direct, statistical evidence of a time series nature about diversification -most of what we know, or think we know, about the evolution of diversification is inferred from crosssectional evidence.
This paper examines 55 years of diversifying mergers, covering the period , with a focus on how announcement returns have evolved over time. We believe this is the first attempt to construct a statistical history of the movement over such a long period, a period that encompasses virtually the entire life of the modern diversification movement. Our goal is shed some light on several prominent explanations for the apparent decline in popularity of corporate diversification beginning around 1980.
2
Antitrust
Antitrust policy has long been suspected of playing a critical role in the diversification movement (Posner, 1974; Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Matsusaka, 1996) . Tough antitrust enforcement in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, may have made it difficult for large firms to acquire other firms in their own industries. Acquirers with an "urge to merge" had to seek partners in unrelated businesses, resulting in diversification. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration relaxed antitrust policy, allowing firms to merge horizontally. Firms could then return to horizontal expansion, which they preferred, and diversification fell from favor. Existing diversified firms were acquired and busted up, their assets redeployed into related industries (Baghat, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990) .
Internal Capital Markets
The economic rationale of the diversified firm rests in part on possible advantages of internal capital allocation: if resources can be moved from low to high return projects at a lower cost internally than through markets, diversification can be efficient (Williamson, 1975; Stein, 1997) . The relative value of an internal capital market is greatest when external capital allocation is costly. Another perspective on the diversification movement is that conglomeration was valuable in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s because external capital markets were not highly developed; but when external capital markets improved in the 1980s due to deregulation, increased professionalization, and heightened disclosure, among other things, the benefits of internal capital markets declined relative to their costs, and diversification fell from favor (Bhide, 1990; Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002 ).
3
Agency Problems
A central theme of modern finance research is that managers might pursue private benefits at the expense of shareholder value. Diversification could benefit managers through creation of empires (Baumol, 1967) , risk reduction (Amihud and Lev, 1981) , or entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) . The market for corporate control can limit value-destroying diversification by separating bad managers from their assets. Another explanation of diversification trends is that unrelated acquisitions thrived in the 1960s and 1970s because investors lacked the means to control managers. Diversification activity dwindled in 1980s with improvements in control markets due to development of the hostile takeover and innovations in financing techniques such as junk bonds, a trend continued in the 1990s with increased use of incentive pay for top executives and better monitoring by shareholders (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001 ).
We attempt to evaluate these explanations by examining announcement period returns from diversifying mergers. In an efficient market, the abnormal return for the combined merging firms is an unbiased measure of the market's expected value change associated with the merger. We first show that the combined abnormal return from diversifying mergers was positive on average throughout the period, especially in the late 1960s, but declined around 1980. We then try to understand what caused the returns to fall after 1980. If a relaxation in antitrust policy was important, we would expect returns from diversification to have fallen the most for large firms since large firms were the most likely to have been prevented from merging horizontally. In fact, we find that 4 returns fell the most for small firms. This pattern points toward the internal capital market hypothesis since small firms were more likely than large firms to have been financially constrained in the 1960s. The internal capital market view is reinforced by evidence that the return from diversifying acquisitions that match a financially constrained (measured by the dividend payout ratio) and a financially unconstrained firm -a pairing that Hubbard and Palia (1999) argue is conducive for the formation of an internal capital market -was positive up to 1980, but negative after 1980. We also find that combined returns were positive throughout the sample period and bidder returns were not negative before 1980, casting doubt on the idea that agency problems led to value-destroying acquisitions or that rise of conglomerates was driven by agency problems. In short, our evidence suggests that the rise and fall of diversification was partly a response to changes in the efficiency of internal versus external capital markets.
Although the primary purpose of our paper is to understand changes in diversification over time, our evidence also speaks to a question that has received a great deal of attention recently: does diversification create or destroy value? In an influential article, Jensen (1986, p. 660) argued that "diversification programs are more likely to generate losses than takeovers or expansion in the same line of business." In contrast, we find that diversifying mergers systematically increased value during the announcement period, and the gains were not significantly less than from related mergers. Most previous evidence on announcement returns focused on bidding firms alone. Evidence on the combined returns -which is necessary to assess the overall value consequences of diversification -has been fragmentary, especially for the critical years surrounding the conglomerate merger wave. Until recently, most evidence on diversification came down 5 on the side of value destruction, particularly the finding that diversified firms trade at a discount compared to single segment firms (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Stein, 2003) .
However, several studies in the last few years suggest that the "diversification discount" may be the cause rather than the consequence of diversification (Matsusaka, 2001; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Burch, Nanda, and Narayanan, 2003; Villalonga, 2004b) or the discount may be a statistical artifact arising from the nature of segment reporting (Villalonga, 2004a) . Other recent research focused at the plant level finds that conglomerates are no less or more productive than specialized firms (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Schoar, 2002) . Our findings tend to support the emerging revision of views about diversification by showing that investors viewed diversifying mergers as value creating not value destroying over the last 55 years.
Section II of the paper describes the data and empirical methods. Section III presents the results in three subsections, one on antitrust, one on internal capital markets, and one on agency problems. Section IV concludes.
II. Data and Methods

A. The Sample
The sample consists of 3,667 mergers involving publicly traded firms that took place between 1950 and 2004. A significant amount of pre-1980 data had to be collected by hand. We began with CRSP firms that were delisted from the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ due to an acquisition. We then used the SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions Database (SDC) to identify the acquirers and announcement dates for 1981-
2004
. We traced acquirers that were owned by another company back to the parent, and 6 deleted foreign firms. For 1950 -1980 , SDC data are incomplete (1979 -1980 dropped. In addition to losses from missing data, we deleted observations when the company's only SIC code was 67 (holding company), the acquirer already owned more than 10 percent of the target, or there was a dividend, equity issuance, stock split, or share repurchase announcement in the event window.
The sample is constructed along fairly standard lines. The main difference from previous research is that we extended the history back to 1950, whereas most studies only go back to 1980 or so when CRSP and SDC become more complete. The cost was that a significant fraction of the data had to be hand-collected, and there could be some comparability issues across time. 1 The final sample is a more-or-less complete list of mergers involving publicly traded companies over the last 55 years, making it (we believe) the largest and longest such sample to be studied.
B. Definition of Diversifying
One methodological decision is how to define "diversifying" versus "related" 4 Abnormal (or "excess") returns are calculated by subtracting the return on the value weighted market index during the event window from the firm returns. We do not report abnormal returns using the CAPM (following, for example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) ). Little if anything is lost by focusing on net-ofmarket returns instead of using a more complicated asset pricing model to generate expected returns. As Brown and Warner (1985) and Fama (1991) We study both the combined (bidder + target) return and the return for acquirers alone. The combined return is the sum of acquirer and target cumulative abnormal returns, weighted by the ratios of acquirer and target market values to the combined firm's market value. Market values are equity values three days before the merger announcement. We also experimented with measuring abnormal returns in dollar amounts rather than as a percentage, following Malatesta (1983) , Matsusaka (1993) , and Hubbard and Palia (1999) . Although dollar returns have some conceptual advantages, inference is complicated by the exceptionally large (positive and negative) returns in the late 1990s.
Finally, returns are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. For the resulting sample of 3,667 mergers, the mean (median) excess return for the acquirer and target combined is 1.2 (0.8) percent, for the acquirer is -1.1 (-0.8) percent, and for the target is 17.4 (15.0) percent. These numbers are comparable to those reported by Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001 ) for 1973 .
D. Control Variables
Our analysis tries to explain why the abnormal returns from diversifying mergers changed over time. We control for several variables that are known to influence merger returns in addition to those we are primarily interested in.
Method of payment. We include a dummy variable equal to 1 when the method of payment involved stock. The method of payment could matter if managers are asymmetrically informed about the firm's value (Myers and Majluf, 1984) or for tax reasons because stock transactions are generally tax free while cash transactions are not (Brown and Ryngaert, 1991) . We also tried breaking out mixed (cash + stock) offers, but it has no effect on our main results. For the full sample, 50 percent of acquisitions used only stock for payment, 24 percent used only cash, and 26 percent used a mixture of cash, stock, or other securities. Sixty-eight transactions for which we could not determine if stock was used were classified as non-stock mergers.
Tender offer. We include a dummy variable equal to 1 for tender offers. Tender offers are likely to be correlated with whether the acquisition was friendly or hostile.
Sixteen percent of transactions were tender offers.
Firm size. We include two firm size controls. First, since the merger of a small and large firm is likely to have a smaller effect in percentage terms than the merger of two equal-sized firms, we include a variable equal to the market value of the target as a percent of the combined value of the firms three days before the announcement. Second, to control for pure scale effects we include the market value of the acquirer. We explored a number of alternative specifications that also capture the relative size of the firms and 11 the absolute size of the deal; the one we report seems to fit the best, and the main results are fairly robust across alternatives.
Merger waves. Recent research suggests that investors might react differently during than outside a merger wave. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that fads might cause investors to overvalue synergy "stories" during waves. To control for this possibility, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 if a merger takes places during a merger wave. Merger waves were identified following the method of Harford (forthcoming). First, the highest 60-month concentration of merger announcements for each decade was identified as a potential wave (using calendar months, with 1990-2004 treated as a single decade). We then tested whether this concentration of mergers was significantly different at 5% level from the empirical distribution of 1,000 randomly generated samples of the same number of mergers for that decade, giving each month an equal probability of merger occurrence. This procedure yields five 60-month merger waves, 11/29/1954-11/30/1959, 7/30/1964-7/31/1969, 12/30/1974-12/31/1979, 4/27/1984-4/28/1989, 7/30/1996-7/31/2001 . Sixty percent of sample mergers took place during one of these waves. We also tried more subjective definitions of waves, with no material change in the main results.
* * *
In addition to these control variables, we also tried including variables for multiple bidders, hostility, whether the target was diversified, and whether the bidder was diversified. Some of these variables were only available for part of the sample period. In no case did we find a material change our main findings.
III. The Decline of Diversification
We begin our analysis with a statistical overview of the pattern to be explained. Figure 1 plots the total number of mergers in our sample over time as well as the number of diversifying acquisitions measured at the 2-digit and 3-digit level, all divided by the number of publicly traded firms in the year of the merger.
The total number of mergers follows the pattern that is now familiar: the conglomerate merger wave of the late 1960s, a smaller wave in the late 1970s, the "consolidation" wave of the 1980s, and the extraordinary "dot-com" (?) wave of the late 1990s. Diversifying mergers peaked during the aptly named conglomerate wave of the 1960s, and enjoyed a modest renascence in the 1970s. Diversifying mergers plunged after 1980 and remained rare until the mid-1990s, when they reappeared in the wake of that decade's merger wave. The diversification pattern is fairly similar whether measured at the 2-digit or 3-digit level. It would not be accurate so say that diversification has been rejected as a corporate strategy, but it does appear to have lost some of its appeal since the 1960s.
Merger announcement returns tend to reinforce this conclusion. Figure The smoothed excess returns generally track the overall levels of diversifying merger activity and the popular depiction of the diversification movement. An analysis of the medians (not reported) paints a qualitatively similar picture.
The premise of our analysis is that announcement returns provide a measure of the value consequences of mergers. This interpretation is supported by evidence that post-merger operating performance is correlated with announcement returns (Healy, Palepu, and Ruback, 1992) and bidders with negative returns are more likely to be acquired and busted up later (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990 ). Later we discuss the possibility that responses to merger announcements (particularly the method of payment) instead reflect updating about the underlying value of the assets.
To some extent the changes over time in returns from diversifying mergers may be the result of factors that drive the returns from mergers in general. It is therefore interesting to compare the return from diversifying and related mergers. 
IV. Explaining the Fall in Returns
Since Figures 
A. Antitrust
One prominent explanation for the decline in diversification centers on changes in antitrust enforcement (Posner, 1974; Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Matsusaka, 1996) .
Tough enforcement in the 1960s and 1970s allegedly forced would-be acquirers to buy firms in unrelated industries. With laxer enforcement in the 1980s, firms were free to merge horizontally and diversification became less desirable. Our analysis of the role of antitrust is based on the observation that large firms are more likely to be constrained by antitrust than small firms. Antitrust enforcement has traditionally focused on market concentration and how a merger would affect the concentration (see, for example, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States (1962) and United States v. Von's Grocery Co. (1966) .) The Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines lay down conditions under which a merger will be scrutinized that depend on existing concentration of the market (as measured by
Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index since 1982) and how much the merger will increase concentration. All else equal, a merger involving a large firm will increase concentration more than a merger involving a small firm.
5
If antitrust was an important factor behind the decline of diversification, we should observe the greatest changes after 1981 among the largest firms because these were the firms most subject to antitrust scrutiny. To see if this is true, regressions (3) and (4) estimate how the return from diversifying changed over time separately for large and small firms. "Large" acquirers are defined to be firms whose market value three days before the announcement was in the top 10 percent of all publicly traded firms. About half of the sample fits into this group. The remaining firms are classified as "small" acquirers.
In contrast to what the antitrust hypothesis predicts, the combined return from diversifying actually fell less for mergers involving large bidders than mergers involving small bidders. For large bidders, the return fell by 0.81 percent. For small bidders, the return fell by 1.36 percent. We estimated but do not report similar regressions that classified firms according to their size relative to firms in the sample (instead of all traded firms) with similar results.
Columns (7) and (8) present similar regressions to explain the decline in the relative return from diversification. Regression (7) shows that for the largest acquirers, the relative return increased by an economically trivial 0.06 percent after 1980, while for smaller acquirers it fell by a statistically significant 1.58 percent. Whether measured in absolute or relative terms, the return from diversification appears to have fallen more for small firms than large firms, contrary to the antitrust hypothesis.
The evidence in Table 2 points in the same direction as evidence in Matsusaka (1996) that also seems inconsistent with the antitrust hypothesis. Matsusaka finds that small firms were more likely to diversify than large firms in the late 1960s and early 1970s, even though antitrust would be expected to have induced the largest firms to diversify. For our sample, we find (but do not report) that large firms were 6 percent more likely to diversify before 1981, and 3 percent more likely to diversify afterwards, which supports the antitrust hypothesis, but the differences are modest and vanish when the five control variables are considered. Matsusaka also documents conglomerate merger waves in Britain, Canada, France, and Germany in the late 1960s even though those countries had no significant restrictions on horizontal mergers at the time. 
B. Internal Capital Markets
What could explain why the return from diversification fell the most for small firms? One possible explanation is related to the hypothesis that external capital markets 6 The findings in Table 2 are robust to using a [-5, +5] window. When vertical mergers are deleted using the crude classification discussed above under data collection, the key effects are generally stronger. When diversification is defined at the 2-digit level, the key coefficients are qualitatively similar but less significant statistically. In no case do we find a larger fall in returns for large firms than small firms.
18 became more efficient in the 1980s, making internal capital markets less efficient. There are some reasons to believe that development of external capital markets would be most beneficial to relatively small firms. The largest firms, even in the underdeveloped capital markets of the 1960s, probably still had relatively easy access to capital. It was only among the smaller firms that external financing was particularly costly, making internal capital markets valuable. This would explain why small firms experienced the sharpest declines in return from diversification in the 1980s. The negative coefficient on acquirer size in regressions (4) and (8) but not regressions (3) and (7) points in the same direction:
holding constant the relative size of the target and acquirer, small firms earned larger returns than small firms among the group of bidders not in the top size decile.
We next attempt to place this conjecture on a stronger empirical footing. The main idea underlying an internal capital market is to allow headquarters to shift resources from low return projects to high return projects. Internal resource transfers add value only to the extent that they are more efficient than transfers that take place across external capital markets (Williamson, 1975) . Stein (1997) shows how such transfers can be efficient when headquarters knows more about unit investment opportunities than outside investors. Following this line of reasoning, Hubbard and Palia (1999) argue that a merger is most likely to create a valuable internal capital market when one firm is financially constrained and the other is not. In this case, the unconstrained firm can transfer resources to the other firm.
To test whether the changes in the value of internal capital markets can explain the evolution of returns, we identify mergers that involve a financially constrained and a financially unconstrained firm. The hypothesis is that the match of a constrained and an unconstrained firm provides an opportunity to exploit an internal capital market. If this interpretation is correct and internal capital markets are valuable, then matches of constrained and unconstrained firms should earn higher announcement returns than other mergers. We follow Hubbard and Palia by using a measure of a priori financial constraints, the dividend payout ratio, to classify firms into those likely and unlikely to be financially constrained. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) argue that firms with low dividend payout ratios are a priori more likely to be financially constrained than firms with high dividend payout ratios. Controversy surrounds the measurement of financial constraints (for example, see Kaplan and Zingales (1998) ) and the dividend payout ratio is an admittedly crude proxy, but we think it is a reasonable starting point given the antecedents in the literature and the difficulty of finding measures extending over 55 years and thousands of mergers. We first determined whether each firm in the merger had a dividend payout ratio above or below the median for merging firms during the decade of the merger, called "high" and "low" dividend payout firms, respectively. 8 Then we created two dummy variables, one for a merger with high dividend payout buyer and a 8 The algorithm, based on Hubbard and Palia (1999) , was a bit more complicated than the text suggests.
First, since many firms had missing data, we collected information on dividend payouts for the two years preceding the merger. If both years were available, we used the average, otherwise, we used the single year that was available. Second, bidders were ranked with respect to the median of all bidding firms, and targets were ranked according to the median of all target firms. Third, for a merger in the 1960s, dividend payout ratios were benchmarked to payouts in 1960-1969, and so on, except for mergers after 2000, which were benchmarked to 2000-2004. low dividend payout target, and the other for a merger with a low dividend payout buyer and high dividend payout target. Hubbard and Palia (1999) conduct a similar exercise for the 1960s and find that bidders earned higher announcement returns when an unconstrained firm acquired a constrained firm. Because they examine only returns for bidders, their results do not shed light on whether internal capital markets were viewed as economically efficient. We lose 563 observations from the full sample because of missing dividend payout data. 10 In an unreported regression that pools all 55 years but allows the internal capital market coefficients to vary before and after 1980, the 1950-1980 coefficient on mergers with low payout bidders and high payout targets is different than the 1981-2004 coefficient at better than the 1 percent level.
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The previous section revealed that the decline in return from diversification was concentrated among the smallest acquirers. If internal capital markets can account for part of the decline, then the financial constraint variables should be more important among small bidders than large bidders up to 1980. Regressions (2a) and (3a) estimate the return separately for small and large bidders, where the definition of a large bidder is a firm in the largest market value decile as in Table 2 . Regression (2a) shows a positive coefficient of 1.21 percent on the dummy for mergers involving low payout bidders and high payout targets. The coefficient on this dummy is 0.59 percent and insignificant for large firms in regression (3a). After 1980, the coefficient becomes negative for both large and small acquirers, as shown in regressions (2b) and (3b). Thus, the evidence suggests that internal capital markets were primarily valuable for smaller bidders during 1950-1980, but lost their value in subsequent years.
Column (4) reports regressions for mergers between related firms. Both financial constraint variables are quantitatively trivial before 1980, suggesting that creation of internal capital markets was not important for horizontal mergers. Somewhat anomalously, the coefficient on mergers between low payout buyers and high payout targets is a large and significant 1.05 percent in the period 1981-2004. 11 Another way to assess whether smaller bidders were taking advantage of internal capital market efficiencies before but not after 1981 is to examine how often their mergers involved constrained and unconstrained firms. Table 4 reports the percent of 11 The main results in Table 3 are robust to a 2-digit definition of diversification. When vertical mergers are deleted using the crude method discussed in the data section, the key coefficients in Table 3 grow in magnitude and become significant at the 10 percent level. When returns are measured over a [-5,+5] window, the second internal capital market dummy variable falls by half in (1a) our classification method falsely includes some diversifying mergers in the sample of related mergers. In any case, it seems that small diversifying bidders were much less likely to make acquisitions that exploited internal capital markets after 1980, which is consistent with the other evidence suggesting that the fall in diversification was partly due to a declining value of internal capital markets.
C. Agency Problems
A third explanation for the rise and decline of corporate diversification emphasizes agency problems. According to this view, diversification is a valuedestroying corporate strategy that firm pursue because it provides private benefits to managers (Jensen, 1986) . Diversification flourished in the 1960s and 1970s because of faulty corporate governance. In the 1980s, with the development of the hostile takeover and low cost methods of financing, investors were able to gain control of many corporations and block or in some cases undo inefficient diversification (Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990 ).
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The agency explanation for the rise and decline of diversification would seem to have three distinct, empirical implications. The first is that diversifying mergers destroyed value. The second is that managers pursued diversification at the expense of shareholder value. And the third is that agency-motivated diversification declined in the post-1980 period. We present evidence on each of these implications next.
Did Diversifying Acquisitions Destroy Value?
As discussed in the introduction, there is an extensive literature investigating whether diversification destroys or creates value. The best known evidence -the "diversification discount" -is cross sectional in nature and has been challenged recently on a variety of grounds (Matsusaka, 2001; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf, 2002; Villalonga, 2004a Villalonga, , 2004b . Our approach is to estimate the value consequences of diversification using event returns. If the announcement conveys no information other than the fact of the merger itself, the excess return is an unbiased estimate of the market's expectation of the merger's overall impact on value. Most diversification research examines only bidder returns (for example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) , Matsusaka (1993) , Hubbard and Palia (1999) Previous merger event studies generally find a positive combined return on average, but do not distinguish diversifying and related mergers (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001) . The notable exception is Chevalier (2004) that reports a mean combined announcement return of 2.8 percent for a sample of 289 diversifying mergers during 1980-1995. Our evidence confirms her findings for a larger sample, but more important shows that the mean combined return from diversifying mergers was positive during the pre-1980 period that includes the conglomerate merger wave, the period in which valuedestroying diversification was most prevalent according to the agency problem view.
Did Diversifying Acquisitions Cost the Shareholders of Bidding Firms?
Morck, argue that if a bidder's value falls when an acquisition is announced, it is likely that managerial objectives are driving the acquisition 12 Our working paper (Akbulut and Matsusaka, 2003) shows that this conclusion is highly robust, holding for the 2-digit definition of diversification, alternative measures of returns, and within 5-year subperiods.
25 rather than maximization of shareholder value. This line of reasoning underpins a second implication of the agency problem hypothesis: diversifying mergers reduce the value of the bidding firm. Indeed, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny's finding that bidder shareholders earned significantly negative returns on average from diversifying mergers during 1980-1987 has been extensively cited in support of the agency problem view. Despite that well known paper, the literature taken as a whole is actually mixed, with some studies finding a positive return on average, some finding a negative return, and others both positive and negative returns depending on time period or specification (Akbulut and Matsusaka, 2003) .
Panel B of Table 5 presents the excess returns for acquiring firms in our sample, which is considerably larger and spans a much longer period than previous studies. For the full sample the mean return for bidders from diversifying acquisitions is -0.65 percent, a number significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. The median is also negative and significant. However, the mean return for the period 1950-1980 is a statistically insignificant 0.04 percent. A diversification announcement was bad news for the shareholders of the acquiring firm after 1980, but not during the years surrounding the conglomerate merger wave. The evidence on bidder returns before 1980 is generally consistent with previous research using smaller samples (Matsusaka, 1993; Hubbard and Palia, 1999) , but difficult to square with the hypothesis that the rise of diversification was fueled by empire-building managers who disregarded the wishes of their shareholders.
The announcement return may reflect more than the market's assessment of a merger's effect on firm value; it may also reflect updating of the underlying quality of the assets because of information revealed by the announcement. One relevant piece of 26 information is the method of payment. If the acquirer pays with stock, then the announcement return compounds a reaction to the merger with a reaction to an increase in outstanding equity. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that if managers have private information about the value of their firm's assets, a stock issue signals that the stock is overpriced. Empirically, seasoned equity issues are associated with negative announcement returns in the neighborhood of -3 percent on average (Smith, 1986) , and the returns from merger announcements (not specifically diversification announcements) are about 3 percent lower when stock is used instead of cash (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001) . It is reasonable to think, then, that the announcement return for acquisitions that use stock underestimate the wealth effects of diversification by about 3 percent on average.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the mean return for mergers involving stock and cash separately. Mergers involving a mixture of stock and cash are assigned to the stock category, but nothing material depends on this. Consistent with theoretical expectations and earlier evidence, stock mergers earned 1.89 percent lower excess returns than cash mergers for the full sample. The return associated with stock acquisitions is reliably negative, ranging from -0.35 to -1.94 percent, but never by enough to outweigh the -3 percent recent attributable to the issuance of stock alone.
The return from cash acquisitions is positive in the full sample, with a mean of 0.67 percent and a median of 0.19 percent, and both values differ from zero at the 10 percent level or better. Thus, when the signaling value of stock is left out, bidder shareholders appear to have benefited from diversifying acquisitions on average. The mean and median return from cash acquisitions is positive in both subperiods, but largest 27 in the 1950-1980 period (1.12 percent). Again, this earlier period is when valuedestroying diversification was most prevalent according to the agency problem view.
The use of cash, like stock, could bias the announcement return, but the direction of the bias is unclear. Cash transactions are taxable, which would bias down the return (Brown and Ryngaert, 1991) . The return would also be biased down if the use of cash alerts investors to free cash flow problems, as Jensen (1986) suggests. On the hand, in a free cash flow situation, investors might prefer the firm to use its cash for an acquisition rather than waste it on an internal investment, in which case the announcement return would be biased upward. Table 5 may also underestimate the effect of a merger on value in another way.
Theory suggests that firms are likely to make acquisitions when their assets are of low quality or poorly matched to their current businesses (Gort, Grabowski, and McGuckin, 1985; Matsusaka, 2001; Jovanovic and Braguinsky, 2004) . Thus, a diversification announcement may send a negative signal about the quality of the firm's current operations, and cause investors to downgrade their estimate of the stock's value independent of their assessment of the merger's effect on value.
Did Bidder Returns Improve after 1980?
The agency problem hypothesis maintains that corporate governance improved in the 1980s. If negative bidder returns indicate managerial misbehavior as some evidence suggests (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990) , and if agency problems became less severe after 1980, then bidder returns should have been less negative during 1981-2004 than in the previous period. Act. The Williams Act required bidders to disclose more information in tender offers, allowed tendering shareholders to withdraw their tendered shares within seven days, required pro-rationing of tendered shares after 60 days, and required all shares to be bought at the highest price -all of which were intended to protect the rights of shareholders of target firms. The Williams Act reduced the share of merger gains captured by acquiring firms (Jarrell and Bradley, 1980) . bidder returns from diversifying and related mergers either before or after 1980. This evidence further undercuts the view that diversification in general has been driven by managerial objectives. It also does not lend support to the idea that the evolution of returns has been driven mainly by changes in the effectiveness of corporate governance and mitigation of agency problems. Instead, the evidence in Table 6 suggests that bidder returns from diversification are no more or less connected to agency problems than returns from related mergers, that is, diversification is not diagnostic of an agency problem.
We do not have enough evidence to say much about what caused the decline in bidder returns after 1980. We know from Table 2 (columns (5)- (8)) that combined returns did not fall for mergers in general. So the post-1980 fall in bidder returns seems best understood as a change in way merger returns were divided between acquirers and targets. It may be that antitakeover legislation and jurisprudence beginning in the late 1980s enhanced the position of target firm shareholders, allowing them to capture a larger fraction of the takeover gains (Jensen, 1993 
V. Discussion
This paper studies announcement returns from 3,667 mergers over the last 55 years in order to understand the forces that led to waning of corporate diversification. We
show that there was a fall in combined (bidder + target) announcement returns from diversifying mergers, in both absolute terms and relative to related mergers, around 1980.
Announcement returns thus reflect the widely held belief that diversification fell from favor not too many years after the conglomerate merger wave.
Although we do not have a definitive answer on what caused the rise and decline of corporate diversification, several findings emerge from our analysis that point toward an answer. First, combined returns fell the most for mergers involving smaller bidders; returns for mergers involving firms in the top market size decile changed much less. This pattern makes it unlikely that antitrust policy was the main force driving diversification because antitrust affects large firms more than small firms. Second, mergers that paired financially constrained bidders with financially unconstrained targets earned high returns for smaller bidders during 1950-1980, but did not command a premium during . A story that would fit the facts is that external capital markets were inefficient before 1980 or so, at least for smaller firms, and mergers that allowed them to operate internal capital markets were perceived as valuable by investors. As external capital markets improved, the value of internal capital allocation declined, and mergers by small firms to exploit internal capital markets were received less favorably.
We also find that the mean combined return from diversifying mergers was consistently positive during the 55 years of our sample, and especially large during the years surrounding the conglomerate merger wave. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that diversifying mergers were value-destroying generally, or during the heyday of conglomeration. We also find that bidder returns were not negative during 1950-1980, inconsistent with the idea that conglomeration was pursued at the expense of shareholder value, and while bidder returns were negative for 1981-2004, the effect can be explained entirely by the predictable negative market reaction to stock issues. Thus, our evidence tends to support the growing literature that challenges the prevailing view that diversification is normally a value-destroying strategy.
To make the scope of the project manageable, our paper focuses on three popular explanations for the diversification movement. As a result, we pass over other explanations that have been proposed, such as the idea that diversification was a fad (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) or a failed experiment (Matsusaka, 1993) . Time series evidence on some of the more popular alternative explanations would seem a worthwhile topic for future research. Notes. Each column is a regression. Heteroskedasticity consistent (White) standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the combined (bidder + target) net-of-market return over a [-2,+1] window, expressed as a percent. The sample includes all mergers involving two publicly traded firms during . "Large" bidders are firms in the top market value decile of all publicly traded firms three days before the announcement; "small" bidders are all other firms. A merger is "diversifying" if the bidder and target did not share a 3-digit SIC code among their top six SIC codes. Significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. A "large bidder" was a firm in the top market value decile of all publicly traded firms three days before the announcement; a "small bidder" was not in the top decile. A merger is "diversifying" if the bidder and target did not share a 3-digit SIC code among their top six SIC codes. Significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. Note. Firms were classified as "high" or "low" dividend payout according to whether their dividend payout ratio was above or below the median of other firms during the decade of the merger. The entries show the percent of mergers involving a high payout bidder and low payout target or a low payout bidder and high payout target. A merger was "diversifying" if the bidder and target did not share a 3-digit SIC code among their top six SIC codes. "Large bidders" were firms ranked in the top market value decile of all publicly traded firms two days before the announcement; "small bidders" were firms not in the top decile. Note. Each column is a regression. Heteroskedasticity consistent (White) standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the bidder's net-of-market return over the window [-2,+1] , expressed as a percent. The sample includes all mergers involving two publicly traded firms during 1950-2004. A merger is "diversifying" if the firms did not share a 3-digit SIC code among their top six SIC codes. Significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
